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MASTER'S ESSAY
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# THE SPAN ACROSS THE CHASM

by

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"Are viable democratic government and
effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims?"

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"See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't care' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we solemnly laid down...
—how grandly does she trample all these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend."

Plato

"If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the omnipotence of the majority, which may at some future time urge the minorities to desperation, and oblige them to have recourse to physical force. Anarchy will then be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism."

Alexis de Tocqueville

"Experience rather tends to show that [popular government] is characterized by great fragility, and that since its appearance, all forms of government have become more insecure than they were before."

Sir Henry Maine

"This incompetent diplomacy, this incompetent diplomacy."

Member of German Reichstag,
August, 1914

"And so the fateful question is put to us directly: Can democracy be active, at times even breathlessly active and remain democracy? Can it be tough without being cruel, alert without being officious, effective without being overbearing, authoritative without being authoritarian?"

Clinton Rossiter

## INTRODUCTION

"Are viable democratic government and effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims?" Phrased in that manner the question is startling, for it seems to deny one of the great American traditions; the inevitable triumph of democracy, both in matters domestic and external. This question sets in opposition in a fundamental form the two great desideratums of 20th century America. Reflection on the two opposed aims produces a form of mental breathlessness for there is a huge and terrifying chasm which has opened up between compatibility and irreconcilability. The query, while it may be fashioned in an academic style is far from sterile, as it contains immense implications for the survival of the human race as well as for the continued existence of a way of life which many consider precious. But does it mean that the pursuit of one objective implies a failure in the effort to attain the other?

A daring student could plunge into a snap judgment in favor of either the traditional line of democratic infallibility or the line of a basic dichotomy between the two aims; it is possible to support either contention quite adequately with not very extensive research into the words of scholars and the deeds

of governments. The dialectic with some justification, especially if one took the line that democracies are incapable of effective foreign policy, could be entirely based on the writings of the early Greeks, particularly Thucydides and Plato. But if one answers the question by resorting solely to the ancient world he infers that no basic changes have occurred in the intervening 2400 years in the nature of man, or in the political realm. While change in fact may not have taken place, it would be wise to at least survey more recent literature as well as the current scene.

A more deliberate student after careful analysis might possibly furnish proof of a bridge over the gulf of incompatibility; it might be possible for him to assert the existence of harmony between viable democratic government and an effective foreign policy, but it would not be possible for him to erase the distinguishing mark of our time, lingering doubt. The 18th century liberal, it could be said, made a cult of reason and the 19th century liberal paid homage to The People, but the liberal of this century has practically made a science of despair. Skepticism about the efficiency and alertness of democracy has been increasingly noticeable since World War I, perhaps because "once divinity of doctrine has been questioned there is no return to perfect faith."[1] The capacity of democracy to forestall war was placed in jeopardy in 1914 and as the preservation of peace was popularly considered as the almost-unique attribute of democratic foreign policy, it

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[1] Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 145

became inevitable that democracy itself should come under question. The failures, real or apparent, in the foreign policies of the democracies since 1914 have not permitted the present-day liberal to share the unsullied and incredible optimism which was the hallmark of the 19th century democrat. Whereas the earlier liberal could place the blame for the evils of the international arena on the power politics of the non-democratic states, his ideological descendent must look elsewhere for the source of the distressing, even chaotic, vicissitudes of the present day. In fact, the liberal of this era must, and does, with wavering strength and crumbling fortitude of belief, accuse himself of power politics and inept leadership.

If after serious thought, one is unable to reconcile free government and a purposeful direction of foreign affairs; the problem remains, which does one choose? If one should select an effective foreign policy as being more desirable than democracy; then what kind of government would one select to insure such competence, influence, and control? Even a casual reading of history indicates that autocrats and oligarchies have shared in "the propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion....".[2] One might be able to prove that no government has ever been able to consistently conduct an external policy in which it's aims and desires were always observed by all

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[2] deTocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America, I, p. 235

other states. On the face of it this seems a highly plausible proposition, as no state, not even Rome, has been omnipotent. It is entirely possible that "the bad management of foreign relations in the past may lie in the nature of foreign relations themselves, or perhaps in the nature of men as men. The difficulties may be such that no set of men will really conduct foreign policy with wisdom and justice."[3]

It might be possible to answer our topic by following the lead of Aristotle and take a "scientific" approach. One could arrange a typology of states on the basis of their form of government during various periods of history. The investigator could attempt to define the needs, vital and non-vital, of the states as expressed by the various governments themselves. The achievement of these needs or objectives would be the determinant factor of an effective foreign policy. There are problems in this approach; would one place equal weight on each objective, no matter how trivial? Some misleading "scores" might be developed: It might be discovered that a particular state, A, achieved an extremely high percentage of it's needs through time only to be absorbed by another, State B. Can it be said that state A had an effective foreign policy if it did not secure it's survival? Perhaps the information obtained might indicate that one type of government was most effective in one period of history and not in another. Regardless of the difficulties, this method would seem to offer a great deal to the advancement of historical knowledge about

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[3] Bryce, Viscount James, International Relations, p. 185

foreign policy. The sheer magnitude and complexity of such a project, however, places it more in the category of a doctoral dissertation and thus outside the scope of this paper.

We are straying from the original question, perhaps because of it's broad sweep. What we must do is to define, analyze, and prescribe. "Viable democratic government" must be defined if we are to know what we are to preserve. We must look at some of the factors which affect the formulation of foreign policy in a democracy as well as analyze just what an effective foreign policy may mean. And of course we must state the preferences and norms which, in our opinion, the search has uncovered.

## DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY

Obviously it is possible to so define democracy as to prove that it exists only as a figment of the imagination. It is also possible to define it so broadly that it includes tyranny and despotism. We must be careful to avoid these hazards as well as eschewing the danger of falling into too particular a treatment of a general inquiry. Because of the flavor which particular events lend to an account and because of the easy applicability of the question to the foreign policy of the United States it will be difficult to maintain the essay completely on a general level. Certainly we cannot help but be affected by the facts of our birth and milieu, nor hide their dominant influence on our thinking. We shall have to define democracy as unambiguously as possible, but we shall have to shy away from defining the purpose of the state, which is a related topic but not the subject

of this paper.

What greater irony might be imagined than at the very time that a democratic state is losing credibility with a number of it's members, that governments of every description throughout the world call themselves "democratic?" A headline in a recent issue of the Christian Science Monitor announced, "FRANCO LAUDS HIS DEMOCRACY." [4] Now we can admire Franco's ambition but it is difficult to reconcile the Spanish form of democracy with, say, the British form, and both of these forms vary a great deal from the type of government practiced in the several "Democratic People's Republics." Are they all democracies, or are any of them? What is democracy?

Many men have attempted to define democracy and democratic government; surprisingly most of the early writers with the notable exception of Periclean Thucydides defined what we value in disparaging terms. That this view was so predominant was most likely due to the marginal diet and marauding warriors which forced the ancients to place a heavy emphasis on the polis, group action, and strong leadership. The intellectual heirs of the Greeks and Romans have found it difficult to break away from the Hellenic philosophy, but a contemporary writer has "reversed" Aristotle by maintaining that "society and the state were made for individual men, not men for them."[5] This view, whether acknowledged or not, is the very essence of a true democracy, while

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[4] Christian Science Monitor, August 11, 1961, p. 2.

[5] Meyer, Frank S., In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo, p. 27

the simplest definition is undoubtedly Abraham Lincoln's, ..."Government of the people, by the people, and for the people..." [6]

Concepts like these, while laudatory, are too broad to help us in our examination; we must be more precise and perhaps the Aristotelian idea of Salvador de Madariaga, that "democracy is a relative concept" and his further idea that it is a method and not a type of government may aid us. He feels "there is no such thing as a democracy. There are countries which are more or less democratic. The more people have to [sic] *consent to the Government*, the more enlightened and the freer their consent, the more democratic is the nation."[7] The idea of a relative scale of democracy permits us to interpret the present, confused, arrangement of "democratic" states in a more lucid manner, but it does not tell us what is viable. Clearly, de Madariaga is also distinguishing between government and the governed, something to which we shall refer later.

We still have to determine what a democracy is, and in regards to this, it is probably far more important to examine how a democracy functions rather than simply what it states is the way it should function. "Actions speak louder than words," and how a democracy fulfills it's laws is just, or more, important than the laws themselves. A knighted English writer has expressed the opinion that three principles uphold democratic functioning: The members must *agree to differ*; they must agree to *abide by the rule of the majority*; and they must agree to *reach conclusions by*

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[6] Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863

[7] de Madariaga, Salvador, "What is Democracy", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 3, 1946, p. 23)

*peaceful compromise.*[8] In regard to the second principle, he is quick to point out the danger of a militant or intransigent majority usurping truth as a monopoly and destroying the democracy. The rule of the majority is not an exclusive one; all three functions should be followed, and must be followed if we take an absolute view of democracy. In reaching compromise, neither the tyranny of the majority nor the minority can be permitted to stall democratic processes and the continual change of institutions or procedures which is the indication of vitality. It is not necessary to take the view which favors the state as an organic being to believe in a dynamic state. The latter is simply a reflection of the dynamic and changing human beings who create the state. If we were to continue along this train of thought it would lead us to the idea that in the pursuit of truth *free discussion* is essential to democracy. Free discussion will not lead unerringly to truth, but it will tend to promote it. Free discussion springs from *freedom* itself, which is another of the quick-silver-like concepts with which we must deal. An American has written that freedom is the ability to make a "conscious choice between good and evil, truth and error," a view which emphasizes the moral aspect of politics.[9] A British Socialist is an essentially negative definition, considers freedom to be "*the right to express disapproval*" and that the latter "...is central to democratic government."[10] Sidney Hook, in a newspaper article, declared that the fundamental

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8. Barker, Sir Ernest, *Reflections on Government*, p. 69-70
9. Meyer, Frank S. *op. cit.* p. 22, 56
10. Laski, Harold J., "What is Democracy", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 10, 1946, p. 242

assumption of a democracy is that "*human beings are themselves the best judges of their own interests*, or, at the very least, better judges than any one man or group of men." [11] To this we must have to add - provided they are aware of, and reflect on, the various alternatives in serving their interests. The last definition of freedom ties with the first if we equate the "interests" of a person with the "good."

In the "Golden Age" of Athens ("Silver" might be more appropriate) and in the "Puritan Era" of the New England towns, direct democracy was ascendant. Most writers favor this as the purest or best form of democracy, but some writers who emphasize the anarchial aspect, consider it one of the lowest forms of government. All writers, however, agree that democracy involves some degree of participation, whether direct and aggressive or indirect and concurring. *Participation in making decisions, or electing officials,* places a burden of responsibility on the decision-maker or elector to select the best possible choice; a balance between his own best interests and the interest of all the members of the community. Are all participants qualified to make decisions or elect representatives? What is the method, or who is to determine qualification? A sixth-grade education; an objective test of intelligence; or the tax collector? Each democracy in our relative scale has to determine for itself the "balance between the urges of populism and the imperatives of organization."[12] All but

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[11] Hook, S. "What Exactly Do We Mean By Democracy?" *New York Times Magazine*, March 16, 1947, p. 10

[12] Rossiter, Clinton, "The Democratic Process", *Goals for Americans:Report of the President's Commission on National Goals*, p.74

the smallest political organizations have had to desert direct democracy under the twin impact of exploding populations and governmental functions. Representative government today is necessary from the standpoint of efficiency unless we are willing to break up into smaller communities. The delegation of power to elected representatives in a democracy carries with it the consent of the governed. This consent, which is the cement of democracy, must be freely given; it cannot be coerced through force or by trickery, it cannot be gained through ignorance or by bribe, for if it is so obtained the government is not democratic. The members of a state in order to give consent must be able to engage in a free discussion and thus ignorance of the possible alternatives in a situation by distorting or limiting discussion also warps the state into something less than a democracy. It was for this reason that deMadariaga wrote that "the core of political democracy is the freedom of the press."[13]

Two centuries ago democracy in this country meant equality of opportunity. Two millenniums ago Plato predicted that this symmetry would not be sufficient to please all the members of a community, and that even the grant of absolute equality in all matters capable of legislation would not be sufficient to produce domestic tranquility. Plato maintained that this was so because men possess certain inherently unequal attributes and therefore the drive for absolute equality between them is doomed to

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[13] de Madariaga, loc. cit.

frustration. The profundity of his observations is being proven each day in the modern democracies, as each day brings a demand for some "new" equality. The New York Times printed an article which declared "Governments are more or less democratic depending upon whether political power or influence on political power is shared equally."[14] If this becomes our definition for democracy we shall soon discover that a high level of democratic government cannot exist anywhere. Even in a small, direct democracy one man may be able to speak with more persuasion or force than the others and thus exert a disproportionate influence on political power. Legislative efforts to destroy the various inequalities which exist will only smash the structure which voluntarily holds the state together and provides most of the significant leaders. If legislation should attempt to enforce equality Plato predicted that the democracy would become a tyranny[15] and Hannah Arendt has demonstrated in a terrifying manner the totalitarian result of smashing class and group interests.[16] The answer to the dilemma would seem to be a strict and just application of the original equality of opportunity. If it were scrupulously applied the members of a state would assemble into a loose, natural hierarchy based on their ability and energy; something which no man could rightfully protest.

Democratic participation and equality of opportunity require a... "wide dissemination of powers, responsibilities, and functions..."

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14. Hook, loc. cit.
15. Plato, The Republic, p. 323
16. Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 305-6.

of government, as well as "...a separation, as far as possible, between our political, economic, and religious organization."[17] The inspiration for this concept came from a fear of the rigid alliances which had existed in past times between the exclusive and aristocratic forms of power, and a desire to circumvent them in the new democracies. Locked with this idea was the scheme of *separating the power of government* into co-equal, competing branches with the most even balance presumably being the most democratic distribution. Maintenance of this power balance, once it had been established was neither guaranteed or easily pursued, but it is best found in a respect for law and ordered change. A respect for the rules, or compliance with constitutionalism, is not only necessary in the governed multitude, but is critically important in the governing elite. Only a decent regard for the law can compel the "*governors to think, talk, bargain, and explain before they act...*"[18]

A famous British sociologist believed that it was possible to distinguish between a democratic society and a democratic government but it should be mentioned that his motive might have been to find a defense for the communist state. He felt (with particular emphasis on contemporary economic rationale) that a democratic society was a "community in which the citizens accept the maximum satisfaction of demand as its supreme purpose," which means there are no "special privileges founded on birth or wealth, race or creed."[19] If taken at face value this is clearly a noble order, but

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17. Russell, Francis H., "A Definition of Democracy for Undecided People," *United States Department of State Bulletin*, p.279-283.
18. Rossiter, *op. cit.*, p. 62
19. Laski, *loc. cit.*

it is also an incomplete prescription for it omits reference to privileges founded on intelligence or stealth, occupation or party. Most scholars would have a hard time trying to find, or found, a genuine democratic society as distinct from a democratic government. It would appear that our British tutor was trying to "separate what cannot be separated." "Democracy is a matter of degree, not of kind,"[20] and it is impossible to visualise a democracy without democratic government. What institution in such a structure would guarantee the *freedoms of speech*, *press*, *assembly*, *and opposition*, without which no democracy is possible? Professor Laski's view is platonic, but unfortunately it is also Stalinist. Far more to the point was his definition of a democratic government as one in which, "Those who make the laws of the community in the final instance (a) are chosen by their fellow-citizens for this purpose, (b) operate their authority by procedures which prevent arbitrary decision, and (c) at reasonably frequent intervals submit themselves to their fellow-citizens for approval on the basis of their record in exercising their authority."[21]

Summing up, we can define democracy as that method of government which places supreme value in the worth and freedom of individuals who freely consent to be bound together in changeable but limited institutions which permit them to differ and to agree. The officials of the government who are elected for short terms from among the electors, by the latter, permit free discussion with

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[20] Hook, *op. cit.* p. 48

[21] Laski, *loc. cit.*

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[20] Hook, *op. cit.* p. 46

[21] Laski, *loc. cit.*

all it's ramifications and in all forms of media, in the interest of determining the best possible policy to follow at any particular time. Each individual in a democracy has an equal opportunity to hold the highest office; and the number actively participating in decision-making will be as close as practically possible to the total number of community members.

Finally, we must re-examine the question to make sure that we are answering it. The words in the question are "viable democratic government." In the Oxford Universal Dictionary viable is listed as meaning, "Capable of living; able to maintain a separate existence." In our discussion we have used the words democracy and democratic government interchangeably but we attempted to show that while there may be little nuances and distinctions between them, democracy cannot exist without democratic government. There is, therefore, small value in trying to draw fine lines of difference between such broad concepts. The question seems to be asking can democratic government continue to exist, or more hopefully, can democratic government enjoy a healthy political life?

## III

## THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND NATIONAL INTEREST

How wonderful it would be if after describing the domestic political wisdom of a democracy we could now assert that the same techniques could be applied with equal validity on the international level. Unfortunately we cannot make such an assertion. Admittedly, data is relatively sparse with only three efforts having been made

to apply democratic processes or liberal principles to the solution of world problems, but none of the efforts has met with any great success. While we should not be too hasty in condemning an existing institution, up to the present time the United Nations has not served the peace as well as did the more autocratic Concert of Europe of the preceding century. The League of Nations was a dismal failure if prevention of war is considered as the desired end. Despite the speech-making heralds of a new age bloody conquest still takes place in the international arena. The names of the victors and the vanquished may be different but the struggle for power remains the same. Why?

A scholar has written that war "may break out if power relationships are unclear, or liable to different interpretation,"[22] but this does not explain the cause of war. It does, however, indicate that a prime goal of any wise foreign policy would be to make these power relationships clear and unambiguous. This may help to explain the military tub-thumping engaged in by almost all states involved in a dispute.

A pessimist would say that men, if not basically evil, are inherently weak. Very few men, he would declaim, are able to act continuously in accordance with the dictates of the highest moral good. Men are subject to temptations which lure them to seek after goals which are not in their or the community's best interest. Because of their weak nature many men are dissuaded from active

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[22] Robert Waelder, "Protest and Revolution against Western Societies," The Revolution in World Politics, p. 19

pursuit of tempting goals by fear of ridicule, scorn, or punishment by their fellows. If the stigma of debasement can be cloaked in terms of mass appeal or if there is a promise that the evil fruits can be shared without disgrace, then men who would not succumb to individual desire are likely to band together for the collective act of sin. This could be the reason why states wage war and are less amenable to law and authority than individual men.

An optimist might answer that men are inclined to do good and all that is needed to improve the world is education and the elimination of evil institutions. In his view war is due to ignorance, poverty, disease, and political oppression. The type and extent of the education (indoctrination?) and the evil institutions which have to be replaced vary somewhat with the ideology of the professing optimist. Generally, the optimist believes that free or democratic practices should supplant authoritarian processes and governments. Many optimists (and these are certainly less so) also believe that what is needed is a greater and enforced affirmation of the world community in large, democratic, but authoritative(?), regional or international organizations. They would out-law war but there is no guarantee that in the process they might not destroy freedom.

Neither the views of the pessimist nor the optimist by themselves can explain some of the events in relations between states. We shall have to examine the international structure with more precision if we are to decide how a state can shape an effective foreign policy in a constantly varying environment.

Many students and alas, some statesmen, think that abstract ideas and doctrines can make a foreign policy. If such notions are successful it is through default: That is, due to no state challenging the defective policy. Foreign policies, according to Charles E. Hughes, are "the result of practical conceptions of national interest,"[23] but it should be noted he was writing in a reactionary period after the fall of Wilsonianism. George Washington even issued a prophetic warning, "...it is vain to expect governments to act continuously on any other ground than national interest."[24]

Our appetite is whetted; what is the national interest? Earlier in this essay we gave the opinion that a state is not a living organism, even though it may act like one. For the purpose of defining national interest in a clear manner let us pretend that it is a living thing. The national interest can then be defined as that policy or policies which promotes the health, wealth, growth, or continued existence of the state. To continue the analogy a little farther; some states behave like rational men, some like foolish men, and some states act like wild beasts. If this analogized definition is not sufficient, a more scholarly writer has defined it as being equal "...to the sum of particular interests or a balance of interests in society."[25] The first task of the men, whether they be few in numbers or many, who shape the foreign policy, and fix objectives in accordance with the national

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[23] Charles A. Beard and G. H. E. Smith, The Idea of National Interest, p.1.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., p. 24

interest. Goals may "contain a large measure of idealism, for they represent what a nation considers ultimately desirable not only in its own interest but in that of the whole international community. As such, they are for the most part not immediately attainable. Indeed, they may remain forever in the realm of aspiration."[25] A different view on the matter is that "a nation that sets itself goals which it has not the power to attain may have to face the risk of war on two counts." In striving for such unattainable goals it may "dissipate its strength and lose deterrence value...or inflamed public opinion may force it on to unsolvable war."[27] Policy might be thought of as the scheme of manouver by which accession to the goals can be had, by way of incremental objectives. It may be apparent by now that the goals, policies, and objectives are all more easily identifiable than that amorphous energizer, the national interest. If goals seem abstract, policies confused, and objectives illogical, the fault may not lie with traitorous, stupid statesmen but with the blurred interests of a sprawling, pluralistic democracy.

There is another element which confronts the execution of scheme in the national interest, and this is the simple but overlooked fact of existence of many other competing national interests, possibly none of which are in harmony with any other. In a milieu of competing states "objective information about other countries - is crucial to any attempt at policy-making."[28] In

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[25] William L. Langer, "The United States Role in the World", *Goals for Americans: Report of the President's Commission on National Goals*, p. 327.

[27] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 510

[28] Max Beloff, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, p. 85

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regard to furnishing and evaluating information, men employed in statecraft as in many other occupations have a predilection to tell the boss what is pleasing for him to hear. Because of this weakness there is a "tendency to make information serve policy, not policy rest upon information."[29] False or misleading information may contribute to the reckless selection of objectives and policy and in a world where power and ideology are the key ingredients in attaining goals, the practice can be nothing short of disastrous.

When statesmen formulate the foreign policies and objectives which are designed to fulfill the long range goals of a state they must bear in mind all the information which has been collected on the salient features of the current international scene. Today these features are:

(a) "the acute ideological antagonism dividing the free world and the Communist bloc:

(b) the phenomenal development of science and technology;

(c) the liquidation of European rule in Asia and Africa, and the precipitous emergence of new and for the most part politically inexperienced and economically underdeveloped nations."[30]

(d) a widespread revolutionary spirit characterized by a "passionate desire for change,...and the alienation of the intellectuals from their societies."[31]

(e) the existence of many regional and international organizations the member states of which have only a token regard

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[29] Beloff, loc. cit.
[30] Langer, op. cit., p. 302-3
[31] Waelder, op. cit., p. 3-4

for international law and effective programs of cooperation, but which have a very great desire to use the organizations as propaganda lecterns or diplomatic mediums to achieve their national interests.

Some less salient features, related in a degree to those already mentioned, must also be considered in formulating foreign policy. Without invoking any moral condemnation in our statement, it is clear that the behavior of the Communist bloc is not restrained by any "abstract norms of legal control."[32] This can produce severe distortions in international agreements and friction in relations as the Western world tends to be more responsive to an appeal to legal precedent. It would border on foolishness to maintain that the body of international law has any universal moral basis, but to the degree that states subscribe to common principles there is a greater basis for peaceful cooperation, or at the very least, non-violent disputation.

The bright hope and faith of early advocates in the United Nations as an instrument of the brotherhood of man has been tarnished by later developments. There is no world community. "Divergent ideologies and cultures stress the absence of...[any]...kind of social cohesiveness."[33] The absence of a community spirit means that the United Nations cannot function like a legislature at the present time although a surprising number of people are shocked that

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[32] Richard A. Falk, "Revolutionary Nations and the Quality of International Legal Order," *The Revolution in World Politics*, p. 327

[33] *Ibid*, p. 330.

it does not. Possibly it may legislate in the future but it will have to do so, not in a democratic manner, but authoritatively. And it will have to remain despotic until, and if, world community develops. Pity the statesmen who base their foreign policy on the assumption that there is a world community; they may be magnificent idealists but they will appear to their fellow statesmen and to history as fools.

It is now time to think "about the unthinkable," if only briefly. The massive devastation which the H-bomb is capable of producing has generally caused men to react in two extreme fashions. One group has recoiled in horror from physics and military science, and urgently seeks disarmament in almost abject surrender. The other wing, fewer in number at first but growing, has been attracted by the power of the inferno and cavalierly threatens nuclear war in order to preserve peace. Like all blackmail there is a certain sense of impotency attached to the threat. Both groups can offer rational explanations for their position, but both tend to minimize the fact that men often act irrationally. Neither group offers a sure way to peace, or even to the achievement of more limited national goals.

Any effort to find similarities of the present time in past historical periods is indeed fruitless but a few, tenuous comparisons might be noted. The permeability of state territory today (a term developed by John H. Herz) can be compared with the vulnerability of the Greek city-states. When war erupted between disputing cities, the armies were often able to invade enemy

territory with, or without, opposition. The inhabitants of the region fled to the city where behind buttressed walls they found, at least temporary, refuge. The surrounding farm-lands were ravaged. Despite these depredations and other human atrocities, civilization did not end although a historian might interject that the Hellenic civilization was transformed and Greece eventually fell into cultural quiescence. But who offered any civilization or state a guarantee or even the hope, of immortality?

## IV

## DIPLOMACY

Confronted with these features which affect the implementation of policy, statesmen may resort to diplomacy, propaganda or ideological warfare, military or paramilitary operations (war), or surrender.

In the past during times of peace promotion of the national interest was generally carried out by diplomatic means. These peaceful means might be described as "persuasion, compromise, and threat of force."[34] It has been written that "the art of diplomacy consists in putting the right emphasis at any particular moment on each of these three means." In practicing their art statesmen, like other craftsmen, are apt to weave elaborate tales around their employment of a particular method, but it seems possible that most of them would agree that, "no diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both intelligent and

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[34] Morgenthau, op.,cit. p. 560

peaceful. No diplomacy that would stake everything on persuasion and compromise deserves to be called intelligent."[35] Can diplomacy meet the demands of the present day? As long as individual states or coalitions of states absolutely insist on their own ideas being correct all of the time, diplomacy which is based on accommodation, is impossible. Successful bargaining cannot be accomplished between zealots.

The advent of rapid communications and the vogue for public meetings has blighted the fruitful, private conversations between emissaries. The present-day Ambassador with his electronic ties to the foreign office may be better informed of current events and the latest directives of his superior, but he is less effective in bargaining for the future. Centralised coordination has supplanted individual creativeness, and the TV camera has replaced discriminating analysis. The status of Ambassadors has declined as the miles travelled by the Foreign Secretaries has increased. There has been a tendency for the heads of foreign offices to become nomadic brokers, mere traveling salesmen for a policy or view. A traveling scholar himself, Hans Morgenthau, complained that "the men who are supposed to be the brains of diplomacy, its nerve center, fulfill at best the functions of nerve ends. In consequence, there is a void at the center. There is nobody who faces the over-all problem of international politics and sees all the particular issues as phases and manifestations of

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[35] Morgenthau, *op cit.*, p. 541

the whole."[36]

In regard to another feature of the contemporary world, diplomacy cannot hope to repress revolutionary zeal but it may be able to channelize revolutionary energy, both by bilateral means and by procedures within the United Nations. The UN and other international organizations may have become chiefly devices for waging ideological warfare, but corridor diplomacy may yet prove more powerful than Assembly diatribe. At least let us hope so.

## V

## PROBLEMS FOR A DEMOCRACY IN FOREIGN POLICY

> "...we may ask ourselves whether an organ apparently so unwieldy as the modern electorate, and acting on the level of intelligence which may presumably be expected from such a mass, can properly participate in a system so delicate and subtle. It is perhaps impossible to give a dispassionate and scientific answer to such a question." [37]

An analysis of the international situation would seem to indicate that "democracy is about to be put to a series of tests that will go beyond those of the past in profusion, severity, and perversity."[38] The challenge to American democracy is particularly acute, for not only must this country act with intelligence and skill in the future in external affairs, we must also demonstrate beyond any doubt the advantages of our democratic institutions which have been brought into question by the flaws of past policy.

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36. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 560
37. Barker, op. cit., p. 74
38. Rossiter, op. cit. p. 64

Threats to democracy come from within, right and left, and without, but it must overcome them. We must prove to ourselves as well as the world the "absolute validity of the American philosophy of government...[For]...to challenge democracy in America means to challenge it universally."[39] The imputations of inadequacy in our methods of formulating foreign policy spring not only from other states but from large numbers of Americans. A prominent member of the Foreign Service felt that American practice, and possibly institutions, would have to be changed, for "only a government can speak usefully and responsibly in foreign affairs."[40] It is true that his words do not assault democracy directly, but what he really infers is that no one outside of a relatively select executive group knows anything about foreign affairs, nor should "the outsiders" be allowed to speak on, or influence the conduct of external relations. The justification for this exclusiveness might be the truism, "Wherever there is divided responsibility, there is a weaker sense of duty."[41] It is also nothing more than another example of the "in-gathering" of power common to all executives; a trait which has been distressingly prevalent even in the "great" democracies.

One reason for this executive aggrandizement might be the "very complexity of world politics, and the minute and indirect share of influence which the average person can exercise in this

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[39] Beloff, *op. cit.* p. 12-13

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 19

[41] Bryce, *op. cit.* p. 19

field [has] the effect of repelling interest and involvement."[42] The executive is simply filling the vacuum. Even to the "man in the street" it may be apparent that it takes much knowledge and wisdom to properly evaluate foreign policy. Public apathy to complex issues and acquiescence to executive growth may be "an acceptance of a sound division of labor."[43] This surrender, despite the democratic myth "that the people are inherently wise and just, and that they are the real rulers of the Republic."[44]

Certainly in large democracies the power held by the executive must be greater than what he might hold in smaller communities, if efficiency and direction are to remain equal. The huge size of some modern democracies requires an energetic executive. Exacerbating the friction between individual liberalism and energetic efficiency are the many functions which the government has to perform and "the speed with which they have to discharge them."[45] If a very learned man in 1941 thought the speed at which those functions "have to be discharged has become bewildering;"[46] what would he think in 1963? The requirement for speed in reaching decisions in foreign affairs has increased at the same time as has the imperative for deliberate precision. Speed sometimes holds a threat of disaster, and usually contains a large measure of waste. Lack of speed has been criticized too: "Inefficiency in the conduct of foreign relations

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[42] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, p. 83
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 84
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 4
[45] Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 100
[46] *Ibid.*

has always been deemed to be the grave defect of democratic government."[47] But the slow, agonizing discussion and argument which takes place, or is supposed to take place within a democracy on foreign policy issues often "imparts to democratic policy....a greater ultimate wisdom."[48] Perhaps the energetic executive is a threat not only to democracy, but to effective foreign policy as well? There is a need for coordination, efficiency, and purpose in foreign policy, but this does not require greater executive authority; it demands wiser executive action.

The impulse for efficiency has not prevented some critics from espousing various schemes which would decentralize direction over external affairs. Pre-eminent in this field for the "Democratic Control of Foreign Policy" was Bertrand Russell. The critics, who were energized by liberal dismay at the "reckless drift" into the first World War, and piqued perhaps, at being denied "secrets" and some, inspired by Socialist doctrine, sought to eliminate secret diplomacy and to broaden participation in the formulation of foreign policy, especially issues which might lead to war. While some of their goals were impossible in the present world, many were practical. They felt, in the words of Viscount James Bryce, "a democracy is not consistently democratic if it leaves the issues which make for war or peace in the hands of a few persons permitted to pledge it before they have consulted it [sic]."[49] Their schemes were largely still-born for the democratic

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[47] DeWitt C. Poole, The Conduct of Foreign Relations Under Modern Democratic Conditions, p. 194.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Bryce, op. cit., p. 1[illegible]

public was indifferent and the governing elites made only a few changes. Secrecy in diplomatic negotiations by the democracies since World War I has not been as dangerous or as extensive as it was previously. "The problem of the modern foreign minister, seeking legislative and popular support is often how to get people to absorb more information rather than to keep information from them."[90] But, even if people should absorb more information to the point where they are equal in knowledge to the professional statesman, what guarantee, or indication, is there that they will use the knowledge any better than it has "been used hitherto by the small class which has been virtually left in control of foreign relations."[91] The good citizen could very well have a "narrow and a purely selfish view of the interests of his country, ...[and he may be equally] prone to aggression. It may be that no plan as yet suggested, either that of control by the Few or that of control by the Many, will give complete satisfaction."[92]

We mentioned earlier the dangers of miscalculating the ratios of power between states. It could be argued that a democracy which favored independent thinking might be most apt to reach a correct calculation, whereas an autocratic regime with a corseting ideology might be most apt to miscalculate. This does not mean that the formulation of foreign policy should be left to the arithmetic of the scientists, or The People. Arithmetic, no matter how scientific, is not knowledge of foreign policy and large segments

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[90] Poole, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 156
[91] Bryce, op. cit., p. 183
[92] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 185

of the public know nothing about the factors and events which shape foreign policy. They care even less until some dramatic event in their personal lives makes them aware of the outside world. "If interest, knowledge, and constant participation on the part of the mass [public] were our criteria, we would have to write off all historic democracies as something other than democratic."[53] In the face of this discouraging fact there are still many who insist on popular participation. A committee appointed by President Eisenhower to investigate national goals declared that an informed, an understanding public which could participate in government was an essential condition of liberty.[54] They felt such a public could be achieved through education.

There have been complaints that democracies do not follow a consistent path in foreign affairs; that elections and social mobility bring "fresh and often blank minds to roles of public influence and foreign policy"[55] formulation. An earlier and more favorable observer, one who was experienced in the field of diplomacy, wrote that there were advantages in representative democracy. "By reposing confidence for brief periods in chosen leaders, it gains in tactical mobility, retains the balanced wisdom of deliberate popular feeling, lessens the danger of unwise impulses, and bridges the periods of popular indifference."[56] Now incoherence and non-continuity of policy may lead to danger, certainly will baffle friends as well as enemies, but has the complaint been justified?

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53. Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 139
54. Rossiter, *op. cit.*, p. 77
55. Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 70
56. Poole, op. cit., p. 195

Since 1941 the two great western democracies have followed a remarkably consistent pattern in foreign affairs with very few significant shifts. One, the split from the Soviet Union and the rearming of Germany, Japan, and Italy, was based more on the self-imposed alienation of the Soviet than on Western intent. What authoritarian government can expect to be more consistent, and in what fashion? Dictators die, cabinets change, premiers become senile, kings are overthrown, and chairmen slip. Furthermore, "the most centralized government on earth is, simply from the nature of things, incapable of determining beforehand the actual conditions with which it will have to deal in its intercourse with other governments."[57] Both internal and external reasons are cause for shifts in foreign policy; democracies are not unique in being inconsistent.

It is true, however, that the party politics in a democracy may produce threats of change, or as actual changes, in external affairs. The prevention of this unpredictable practice lies in a co-operative formulation of national interest and an elimination of policies which have been narrowly defined. Since the time of Alexander Hamilton there has been an urge for bipartisanship; since the term of President William Howard Taft there have been speeches on "politics stopping at the water's edge." To insist on bipartisanship is to overlook the fact of actual difference in thinking on foreign policy, differences of opinion which will only

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[57] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, p. 170

rarely divided cleanly along party lines. It would be far better to follow a program of "nonpartisanship", or policies which can unite a majority. Better to avoid policies which unify only the party leaders or small groups of elites. Of course, the inherent pluralism of modern democracies may make it exceedingly difficult to find any policy which pleases all groups, but discussion and compromise can generally establish a solution. "The various public and private groups [and not just political parties] must participate [in the discussion] on the basis of familiarity with the issues. If only a handful of experts are informed and concerned and there is no real policy 'competition' before the public, there is a grave danger"[58] that a faulty or completely inadequate policy will be established. On the other hand, "pressure group parochialism" has prevented from time to time the intelligent discussion in public of broad issues.

One of the interest groups which has developed in modern democracies is that of the professional warriors. The relations of this group with the others within a state, while primary domestic in nature, often has a "spill-over" affect in foreign affairs.[59] In addition, senior military officers have played an increasingly important role in the conduct of foreign relations of most modern states, not simply as agents of policy, or even as participants in group discussion, but as actual policy-makers. While it cannot be the

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[58] Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 85

[59] My unpublished essay on "Civil-Military Relations in the United States" has a fuller treatment of this subject.

function of this paper to fully analyze the implications of this change, it is necessary to point out that inasmuch as this role involves an increase in executive direction and a decrease in democratic discussion, there are potential dangers in the tendency. There is no sound basis to assume that military elite are any more capable in foreign affairs than say, the business elite, or the diplomatic elite. All of these elites and many more are needed to form public opinion and to shape an effective foreign policy.

Another of the difficulties which a democracy must hurdle is the mental tension and confusion resulting from the dichotomy between the restraint, accommodation, and responsibility with which domestic affairs are normally conducted and the rapacious aggressiveness and implacable hostility which it often faces in the outside world. The comparative internal tranquility, the inherent liberalism, and the desire for progress cause a screen of illusion to drop between members of a democracy and the remainder of the world.[60] At home the screen of illusion permits, perhaps even encourages, the democrat to assume that everyone is equal and thus must have an equal voice in determining policy. Universally, he assumes that democracy is the best possible form of government and cannot understand a conscious choice for any other form. The democrat considers that world-wide adoption of liberal institutions is essential, if not inevitable, and in wartime he believes that "democracy is not only something to fight for, it is something to fight with." A democrat wrote during

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60. I am greatly in the debt of Robert E. Walder for this view.

World War II, democracy "is a weapon in our hands if we use it greatly, and if we use it greatly it will conquer."[61] The modern liberal believes strongly in an economic interpretation of the motive forces which propel individuals and states to act, and heavily discounts other incentives. He also feels, as a rationalist and moralist that "law need not have a basis in a community existing in the minds of men and in physical power, but that law can be based on an appeal to conscience alone, and that the social contract can create an effective community."[62] The democrat also assumes that poor and oppressed people will always eventually revolt against cruel and unjust government. It is no wonder that with these illusions effective foreign policy for a democracy seems unattainable. Outside of a dream world utopian solutions are not possible, regardless of how many times the dream is repeated.

There is also a debilitating moral disease afflicting contemporary man and so, very reluctantly we shall now have to detour for a short time from the political highway through a moral quagmire. It is an illness caused by excessive accommodation and liberality. In a modern, pluralistic democracy there is very little possibility of any really strong consensus on an absolute "good." The choice between good and evil breaks down into a selection by a weak majority of the lesser evil. If this is somewhat demoralizing, it is not the worst of the injury. The challenge to the intellect

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[61] Edward H. Carr, *The Future of Nations*, vi.
[62] Waelder, *op. cit.* p. 14.

of choosing constantly between competing evils many of which masquerade as a historic "good" causes one to doubt or reject all standards of conduct. In elected officials, this rejection leads to the advocacy of any program which will perpetuate the sponsor, or supporter, in office. In regard to foreign affairs the breakdown of morality leads to utter collapse of resistance in the face of conflicting demands. The reasoning, "He's as right as we are," regardless of the inherent rightness or wrongness of either argument, is a symptom of this form of debility and alienation. Another manifestation of this moral disease is thinking that all men are good, or that all reasonable men can be brought to view the peaceful solution of a problem in the same constructive light. The most recent example of this failure is the American theory that the Soviet Union would not introduce missiles into Cuba because the Soviets would not want to aggravate a dangerous situation.

A reverse twist on the moral emphasis in politics discussed above is seen in the policy of recognition or non-recognition, particularly as applied by the United States. Customary international practice has been more mechanical in appraisal of new governments than moral. President Woodrow Wilson, if not the originator, was the populariser of a change in emphasis, with attention being paid to how a government came into power. Rather than a simple de facto check, the new policy required a government to meet certain 'democratic' standards. States were to act as a person might in "private life in which one chooses one's friends."[63]

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[63] Beloff, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

The real danger in such a policy was that it permitted democratic governments to "assume that it is possible to choose the governments with whom one has dealings and to ignore those of whose ideologies or practices one disapproves."[64] While there may not be a world community it is incontestable that in today's world no community is isolated.

## VI

## PUBLIC OPINION

We have attempted to skirt the field of public opinion up to the present point, although a few intrusions were necessary. Since it is such a basic factor in democratic theory it must be graced with the status of a chapter heading. Idealists view public opinion as a key ingredient in democratic foreign policy. The bitterest realist agrees, but he inserts the adjective "bad" before "democratic". Why should he be so cynical or disapproving? Martin Kriesberg furnished one answer when, on the basis of public opinion polls, he estimated that 30% of the American electorate were "unaware of almost any given event in American foreign policy." Mr. Kriesberg calculated that a further 45% were "aware but uninformed."[65] If three-quarters of a country which is almost saturated with radios, newspapers, and magazines, is uninformed on foreign affairs, how does the idealist expect to get an intelligent

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[64] Beloff, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[65] Martin Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," in *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, p. 51.

response from the public on foreign policy? Kriesberg went on to say, "What happens in any quarter of the world has an effect on the life of even the humblest citizen, and he must be made to realize it."[66] The statement has an air of intellectual arrogance. Was it Dostoievski who wrote that tragic freedom was to be preferred to compulsory happiness? More humble but no less true is the observation made by a British professor that in foreign affairs "to expect a very high level of information on the part of the electorate is purely utopian."[67] He added, "If the citizen will accept change in his belief or suppositions on foreign affairs it is probably sufficient." To be able to participate intelligently in foreign policy formulation one must be expert in history, geography, and current events, and in addition be somewhat of a philosopher as well as being an "arm-chair" anthropologist. The public cannot be experts because the "average good citizen has not the means of obtaining nor the leisure to study the materials."[68] Lack of expertise should not bar the public completely from being consulted or from expressing opinions on foreign policy for on "certain broad and comparatively simple issues...the people—if not fevered by passion,...may have a [better] common sense view of what is and what is not worth contending for than a group of officials, who may be steeped in traditions or prejudices."[69]

The shallowness of public knowledge and the inherent public

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[66] Kriesberg, _op. cit._, p. 63
[67] Beloff, _op. cit._, p. 58
[68] Bryce, _op. cit._, p. 103
[69] _Ibid._, p. 107

disposition to "go along" with policies that seem to correspond with "cherished traditions" places tremendous power in the hands of what Gabriel Almond calls "the policy and opinion elites." These are people who hold no official positions in the government, who are not responsible to the people for their actions or comments, and who can be extremely selfish and narrow in their advocacy of policy. These elites and the several vocal minority groups by their distortions of the national interest and their near-monopoly power to persuade (propagandize might be a better word) are a definite menace to democracy, if given free rein. Their redeeming grace is the check which they are able to put on government officials so that the latter cannot act without at least thinking of the elite reaction and hence possible censure by the electorate.

Public opinion can be molded, not only by publicists acting for themselves or a narrow interest, but by government officials acting in what they consider to be the best interests of all the people. The ability to mold implies also an ability to sense the shape or response of public opinion, but to extend this perception to the view that government must always be responsive to public opinion is foolishness. What public opinion? The opinion of a professor, or that of a businessman, or of a laborer, or of a relief-recipient? Free consent is essential in a democracy, but we must not forget that "the Government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave."[70]

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[70] Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 587

The efforts of government leaders in influencing the opinion of their own electorate has led to the noxious practice of trying to influence the inhabitants of other states by direct propaganda. Instead of dealing with the opposite government by diplomatic means, an effort is made to force pressure on it from within the other state. While there is something to be said for the use of propaganda in wartime, the practice of blatant ideological warfare in peacetime is not conducive to a long or tranquil peace.

We must not forget the one-fourth of the electorate who are "aware" of foreign policy issues. While it would be presumptious to consider all of them as experts, there is little doubt that all of them could offer intelligent comments on foreign affairs. It is this public which must be listened to in formulating foreign policy. Most likely many of them would have strong biases, or be members of certain interest groups, but it is in the free but lawful play and competition between these groups that dangers would be filtered out, and the flavorful essence would seep through.

## VIII

## RECONCILING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

What we have examined up to this point are the several countervailing arguments which a democrat or an autocrat might offer to defend his point of view in formulating and conducting foreign policy. It does not appear that either one has established a clear superiority, or advantage for his particular mode. And in actual practice no form or method of government appears to possess

all advantages and no limitations. There are dichotomies, tensions, and incoherencies in the foreign policy of any state. While our essay may have seemed ambiguous and confused it was designed to replicate the anxious world.

It is now time to give a clear answer to the challenge posed by our topic question. Viable democratic government and effective foreign policy need not be irreconcilable aims. Any gap between them can be bridged, for the gulf which separates a democracy from effective foreign policy, also exists for all governments. The bridge between them is wisdom and moderation. If they are not irreconcilable goals, neither are they self-fulfilling aims. Both are goals which must be striven for constantly, the one by all governments, the other by a few states. The effort to achieve one goal does not necessarily militate against the effort to attain the other. A great state might employ all it's energy in the field of foreign affairs and still not achieve what it considered to be it's national goals. (Application of too much energy in foreign affairs could conceivably destroy the world as we think of it.) It is more a matter of wise expenditure of effort than it is the totality of effort expended which counts. To borrow from the economist; what must be sought is the achievement of maximum satisfaction between democratic desires and external desires.

It is this last idea which tends to be overlooked by both liberals on the one hand and bureaucrats on the other hand. We must never give up working for better democratic institutions nor for

more unified foreign policy, but it is possible that we could have a surplus of either which would unbalance our system. Isn't it possible for our foreign policy to collapse in a welter of interests if we entrust it entirely to the whims of The People? Yet democratic theory, extended to the absolute, requires just this. And isn't it conceivable that democracy could be undermined if we entrust foreign policy to the executive alone in order to achieve coherence? Yet unity of policy implies singleness of direction.

We have not discussed the form of government, or organization, for while important it is tangential to this essay. Believers in democratic theory such as we place so much emphasis on the equality of man that we tend to make a fetish of organization. In other words, in our tendency to believe that all statesmen are equal, it would follow that the state with the most efficient organization for conducting foreign affairs, will be the state with the "best" external policy. It is foolish to think that a near-perfect organization manned by career-conscious bureaucrats would be as effective as a "patch-work" organization staffed by dedicated believers. Form is less important, at least for our topic, than process.

The fulcrum around which democratic government and effective foreign policy apparently revolve is the portion of the populace who are "aware" of foreign policy issues. (In the United States in 1954, one-fourth of the electorate). The many, diverse, and often brilliant opinions of the serried groups of the "aware" public are perhaps the vital center of a democracy and it's foreign policy. The professional government expert is too limited in his view to be

permitted to set the goals or formulate the policies by himself. But it is the professional working for the executive who will carry out the day to day objective routine. It is this way that democracy and efficiency can both be served. This is not an appeal for dilettante diplomats; the professional will largely fill that role. This is a cry for the essential ingredient of a democracy: interested, intelligent, motivated people who continually examine, analyze, discuss, comment, advise, and suggest policies to the government professional and the executive. This is the public opinion to which a government must be responsive. The government should "lead" that other public opinion which has so often "threatened" diplomats and "cowed" executives.

If the process outlined above may not sound too democratic, one should remember that the "aware" public of the United States today should number some 25 million people. One must admit, however, that while it is an incomplete democracy it is an <u>open</u> oligarchy and an expanding one. Opportunity to become "aware" is open to any citizen who makes the effort. In this regard, education is obviously important and in three different ways.

The education of the "aware" public should continue through the release of all possible information from the government and through the receptive implementation by the government of the fruits of free discussion. In this area moderate efforts will provide relatively large gains in a short time. The second prong of our education policy should be an across the board improvement

for all citizens in their depth and breath of knowledge. The idea has often been expressed as making them better citizens. I would prefer the term, fuller citizens. The greater number of people who possessed greater knowledge would make possible an expanded "aware" public, and hence fuller participation. But we should avoid any utopian time scales; this is a project which may be measured in centuries and not in decades. The third educational program would be conducted among government officials in an effort to increase their moral level. It would stress the wisdom of the "aware" public and their increasing ability to counteract false premises, glib explanations, and withheld news. As a result, there might be some significant changes in government over the long term.

The real fault of the democracies of the past one hundred years has been their zealous misapplication of theory. The lowest common denominator has been sought as being the most democratic. Instead, the attainment of individual excellence should have been the inspiring goal of democracies. It is not too late to correct the awful mistake; and it should be corrected, for it was this which levelled the public and permitted the executive exalted rank. The pursuit of excellence by the members of a democracy will broaden and make more genuine the democracy. The executive would be more inclined to lead by discretion and less by dictate, while at the same time broader participation would uncover greater unity. This could occur because the unique power of small, unrepresentative, vocal minorities or interest groups would be diminished. The small groups would still be heard; but any tyrannical influences which they

might at present hold, would be lessened.

In conclusion, democracy requires participation, but it cannot be "participation" by people who do not care. We must increase and improve participation by the people who do care as well as undertake longterm efforts to increase the number of people who care. If we do this our democracy will remain viable, indeed, flourish, and our foreign policy can be no less ineffective than that of any state.

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